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Events of 2014, particularly in New South Wales and Queensland, have sharpened focus on the 
relation between money and politics, with calls for increased regulation of donations to, and 
expenditure by, political parties. This is despite the existence of other features of our political 
system seeking to limit corruption, like disclosure laws, anti-corruption bodies, independent 
media, and Australia’s standing as one of the least corrupt countries. This paper considers 
whether caps on political donations and limits on election spending are consistent with the 
Australian Constitution. The High Court has found that document requires freedom of political 
communication. This is subject to laws passed to further a legitimate objective, where their 
impact on the freedom is proportionate to a legitimate objective. Here, likely justifications for 
such restrictions are the need to reduce corruption and to create a level playing field. This 
article challenges both arguments, suggesting such restrictions are constitutionally invalid. 
Introduction 
The year of 2014 saw a flurry of activity in the area of electoral finance. The Newman 
Government controversially repealed donation limits, spending caps and other 
measures introduced by the former Queensland Government in 2011. Allegations that a 
major donor to the Queensland Government sought, but was refused, “special 
treatment” in relation to his business dealings were the subject of an anti-corruption 
investigation and are the subject of a pending defamation case.1 Other jurisdictions 
have moved to regulate this area. Events at the 2014 Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (ICAC) inquiry in New South Wales suggested the ease with which 
measures designed to stamp out corruption can be circumvented by determined 
participants. With this flurry of reform, electoral finance law has become a fast-
growing field of scholarly endeavour, in some ways “cornering the market” of electoral 
finance discussion, at least to date. 
The law with respect to financial aspects of politics, or “electoral finance law”, must 
contend with competing philosophies. In the classic liberal tradition, there are those 
who argue for very limited legal restriction on how politics is conducted, including 
laws with respect to political donations, and laws with respect to political spending, on 
the basis that the exercise of these freedoms should only be minimally impeded by 
regulation, for instance to the extent that the exercise of these freedoms impacts on 
rights of others, or where, if the contest between political actors and ideas (ideals) is 
seen as some kind of “market”, there is observed to be market failure.  
                                                          
1 “Palmer Claims Could Rebound on Premier”, Australian, 9 June 2014, p.2. 
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This philosophy would emphasise the essential right of all in liberal democratic 
society to participate in electoral affairs, including standing for office, advocating a 
particular candidate and/or their views, criticising a particular candidate and/or their 
views, or otherwise participating in electoral life by expressing views on political 
matters, having access to views on political matters, being able to find out about 
processes of government in order to gauge the performance of a government, the right 
to associate with others in order to further particular causes, the right to (peacefully) 
protest, as well as the right to vote.2 It would include the right to express support for a 
particular candidate, party or cause by donating money. Ewing states that the 
legitimacy of liberal democracy is dependent on the ability of individuals to participate 
in the process of representative government, by becoming members of and participants 
in the affairs of political parties.3 This has implications for electoral finance laws, since 
clearly many donations to political candidates or parties are drawn from members of 
that party or participants in that party’s activities. 
On the other hand, others believe that significant regulation is justified. This might 
reflect a view of liberalism as simply reflecting and reinforcing entrenched societal and 
economic interests.4 As will be elaborated upon below, typical justifications given for 
regulation include that the law must guard against the perennial danger of corruption, 
or perceptions of corruption, or that the law must work to make the playing field more 
“level”, whatever the basis is of such an assertion, and with confidence that regulation 
can in fact achieve greater “equality”, assuming that to be a desirable thing. Ewing 
writes that the argument for regulation has strengthened as the role of the state has 
evolved, away from service provider and towards facilitator of service provision, 
increasing the risk that some will seek to obtain favour with the government as a 
would-be “service provider”.5  
Advocates of this view might believe that a laissez-faire approach to electoral law 
perpetuates existing power structures within a society, that the existing systems serves 
to favour some “actors” over others, that the weak remain marginalised by such a 
system, and that a laissez-faire approach tends to reinforce the status quo of politics, 
which may be contrary to the wishes and will of the people.  
There are various means by which the law might regulate financial aspects 
associated with elections and politics more generally. It might provide substantial 
public funding for political parties sufficient to meet the costs of modern campaigning. 
It might provide for the reporting of donations on a regular and timely basis, and for 
this to be publicly available information. This would include the declaration of gifts 
that politicians received from others, the subject of the recent downfall of the New 
South Wales Premier, Barry O’Farrell. Of course, this serves to increase accountability 
and helps to reduce the possibility, or the perception, of corruption. It is doubted that 
many would have a serious objection to regular and timely reporting by political parties 
                                                          
2 Sarah Maddison, “Redefining Democracy”, in Clive Hamilton and Sarah Maddison, Silencing 
Dissent: How the Australian Government is Controlling Public Opinion and Stifling Debate (Sydney, 
2007), pp.28-29. 
3 Keith Ewing, The Costs of Democracy (Oxford, 2007), p.33. 
4 “There are many – not without cause – who see liberal democracy as an illusion, as a process in 
which economic power governs through political institutions”: Ewing The Costs of Democracy, p.33. 
5 Keith Ewing, “Political Party Finance: Themes in International Context”, in Joo-Cheong Tham, 
Brian Costar and Graeme Orr, Electoral Democracy: Australian Prospects (Melbourne, 2011), 
pp.146-147; Ewing, The Costs of Democracy, pp.25-26. 
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or individuals of donations or gifts they have received, so this will not be further 
explored.  
Most states by now have anti-corruption bodies charged with investigating 
allegations of corruption or impropriety, usually involving the political process. Events 
of 2014, particularly in New South Wales, reinforced the importance of such bodies in 
the uncovering of legally and/or morally questionable behaviour by public officials. 
The work of these bodies like ICAC and the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) 
in Queensland will not be further explored here, but it is important to acknowledge 
their work in light of the broader picture of regulation of political financing. Of course, 
police also have a role in investigating and prosecuting financial impropriety by public 
officials, including politicians. Testament to this has been the jailing of ex-government 
ministers in various jurisdictions for fraud in relation to financial dealings. 
Obviously, the media also plays an important role in bringing to light many matters, 
including possible financial irregularities involving political parties and politicians. 
Perhaps the most famous example in recent Australian political history was the work of 
Phil Dickie (Courier Mail) and Chris Masters in his Four Corners story “The 
Moonlight State” regarding corruption in Queensland political life in the 1980s, 
leading to the setting up of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and significant reforms to tackle 
then-endemic corruption in Queensland public life. A strong and independent media, as 
we currently have in Australia, also provides part of the “bigger picture” in which 
electoral finance laws operate.6 
Having acknowledged the importance of transparency of donations, strong anti-
corruption watchdogs, and a strong and independent media, in regulating political 
finance, the focus in this paper will be on newer types of regulation of political finance 
in Australia, specifically laws which limit donations to political parties, and laws which 
limit spending by political parties. The purpose is to assess their compatibility with the 
implied freedom of political communication found in the Australian Constitution, a 
freedom which itself reflects the tension between liberalism and “reasonable” 
government regulation. The existing New South Wales regime will be used as the 
exemplar.7   
Outline of a Typical State Regime 
The legislation limits the extent to which an individual can make a “political 
donation”.8 As enacted, the limit (subject to Consumer Price Index adjustment) is 
$5,000 per year to a political party, and $2,000 per year to a particular candidate, or to 
                                                          
6 “Freedom of the press is inextricably linked with the centuries-long evolution of Westminster-based 
democratic traditions”: Helen Ester, “The Media”, in Hamilton and Maddison, Silencing Dissent, 
p.108; Andrew Geddis, “The Press: The Media and the ‘Rupert Murdoch’ Problem”, in Keith Ewing, 
Jacob Rowbottom and Joo-Cheong Tham, eds., The Funding of Political Parties (New York, 2012); 
Sally Young, “Disclosure, Accountability and the Role of the Media”, in Tham, Costar and Orr, 
Electoral Democracy. 
7 Electoral Funding, Expenditure and Disclosure Act 1981 (NSW) (NSW Act); see also Part 13A 
Electoral Act 1985 (SA)(to commence in mid-2015) and Part 14 Electoral Act 1992 (ACT). The 2011 
Queensland donation and expenditure caps were removed by the Electoral Reform Amendment Act 
2014 (Qld). See for discussion Graeme Orr, Putting the Cartel Before the House? Public Funding of 
Parties in Queensland, presentation at Electoral Regulation Research Network Seminar, 18 June 
2014, Griffith University. 
8 This is defined as a gift made to or for the benefit of a political party, candidate or third party, or a 
payment made to attend an event (s85). 
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a third party.9 It is unlawful for the political party, candidate or third party to receive 
political donations in excess of those amounts.10 The legislation also applies a cap on 
electoral expenditure. The cap applies in the period between 1 October in the year 
preceding when the election is held, and the election (which is always during March). 
The spending cap is $100,000 multiplied by the number of electoral districts in which 
the party endorses a candidate,11 with a cap of $100,000 for an individual candidate 
endorsed by a party and running for the lower house12 ($150,000 if they are an 
independent).13 A spending cap of just over $1 million applies to a registered third 
party, one half that amount for an unregistered third party.14 There is an additional cap 
on expenditure mentioning the name of a candidate or name of an electorate, if it is 
communicated mainly to those in the electorate, of $50,000, or $20,000 for a third 
party campaigner. These provisions formerly effectively15 prohibited corporations from 
making political donations, directly or through an individual, but this was declared 
invalid by the High Court in late 2013.16 Donations from property developers, or those 
in the business of tobacco, liquor or gambling, are prohibited.17 The question is 
whether there are any legal arguments that these laws might be constitutionally invalid. 
Constitutional Validity of Regulation of Political Donations and Political Spending 
Clearly enough the Australian system of government envisaged by our Constitution can 
be described as a liberal democracy.18 Obviously, those drafters had two model 
approaches open to them, that of a British Westminster system, and that of the United 
States Constitution. The Australian Constitution is often described as a “Washminster” 
model, intending to convey that it reflects an amalgam of principles, values, and 
provisions derived from both the United Kingdom and United States constitutional 
arrangements. On the question of rights protection, the drafters adopted the 
Westminster model, declining to incorporate an express bill of rights. Their experience 
had not taught them the need for an express protection of rights.19 Our Constitution was 
not crafted in the furious days following a rebellion against an autocratic government; 
it reflected an evolution, rather than a revolution. The drafters placed their faith in 
systems of representative and responsible government to preserve human rights. 
Human rights would be protected by the common law, but would be subject to being 
overridden by (valid) Act of parliament. 
Importantly, and in contrast with the United Kingdom, Australia chose to have a 
written constitution, like the Americans. This was perhaps inevitable with the federal 
                                                          
9 s95A. 
10 S95B. 
11 S95F(2). 
12 S95F(6). 
13 S95F(7). 
14 S95F(10). 
15 This was in the form of a ban on accepting donations from an individual or entity not on the 
electoral roll (s96D(1)). 
16 Unions NSW v New South Wales [2013] HCA 58, on the basis that it was contrary to the implied 
freedom of political communication. Further discussion appears in Graeme Orr, The Law on Funding 
Party Campaigns, 2nd Australian and New Zealand Workshop on Campaign Management and 
Political Marketing, Sydney University, July 2014. 
17 S96AA. 
18 A textual basis in the Constitution includes ss.7 and 24, expressly providing that representatives of 
the Senate and House of Representatives respectively shall be directly chosen by the people. 
19 Sir Owen Dixon, Jesting Pilate (Buffalo, 1965) p.102. 
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structure that was itself inevitable given that the colonies preceded the national 
government. A key task of this document was the allocation of powers between 
different levels of government. Australia accepted the notion of judicial review, 
allowing a court to declare a law to be invalid if it was deemed to be contrary to the 
Australian Constitution. This path had been led by the United States Supreme Court in 
the celebrated decision of Marbury v Madison in the early nineteenth century, 
confirming the power of a court to pass judgment on the constitutionality of Acts.20 
Another feature of the Australian Constitution is its sparseness, comprising 128 
generally short sections of no more than one paragraph. In this way it stands in marked 
contrast to much of the legislation made pursuant to it,21 with complaints often levelled 
against income tax legislation and company law legislation for its level of specificity, 
and complexity. It can be argued that the document was deliberately cast in sparse 
terms as the fundamental legal document of the nation, a document very difficult to 
formally amend. Arguably the drafters intended that the meaning of the words used 
would change over time, to reflect changes in community values, and challenges and 
issues that could not possibly be contemplated by the drafters. 
Perhaps as a result of the relative sparseness of the document, questions have arisen 
as to the extent to which principles can be implied from the document. This is 
particularly important in the human rights area, given the general lack of express rights 
protection in the document. There is a history of High Court judges, including some 
who helped draft the document, holding that implications could and should be drawn 
from the document. For instance, in the early case of Rex v Smithers, Chief Justice 
Griffith and Justice Barton spoke of a citizen’s right to come to the seat of government 
to assert claims on the government and to engage in administering its functions.22 In the 
landmark Engineers decision certain implications that had been drawn from the 
Constitution were rejected. However, Australian jurisprudence moved on, such that in 
1937 perhaps our most revered High Court justice ever noted: 
Since the Engineers case a notion seems to have gained currency that in interpreting the 
Constitution no implications can be made. Such a method of construction would defeat the 
intention of any instrument, but of all instruments a written constitution seems the last to which it 
could be applied.23 
In the 1990s, during a time in which the Court was in a progressive phase, it discerned 
in the system of democratic governance clearly established by the Constitution an 
implied freedom of political communication.24 Given the similarity between the facts in 
that first case and the facts here, it is worthwhile considering them in some detail. 
The case involved legislation banning a broadcaster from broadcasting political 
advertising during an election period. It also required broadcasters to provide free time 
for election broadcasts, based largely (90 per cent) on the number of votes obtained by 
the particular political party at the previous election. There was discretion in awarding 
10 per cent of the free time, but it would likely be allocated to parties successful at the 
                                                          
20 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
21 The Constitution is the enabling document for all legislation made in Australia. It confers power on 
the federal parliament to pass laws in nominated areas (see in particular s.51 of the Australian 
Constitution), and power on state parliaments to pass laws (s107). All legislation passed in Australia 
is subject to the Constitution, and must be consistent with the Constitution. The ability of both federal 
and state parliaments to pass legislation is conferred by the Australian Constitution. 
22 (1912) 16 CLR 99, 108 (Chief Justice Griffith), 109-110 (Justice Barton). 
23 West v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1937) 56 CLR 657, 681. 
24 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 177 CLR 106. 
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previous election. This would disadvantage fledgling parties, or new independent 
candidates, from securing much (or any) free time. Other would-be advertisers, 
including businesses and unions, were also prohibited from advertising during the 
election period. A majority of the High Court declared the law to be invalid, infringing 
a constitutionally implied freedom of political communication. 
The majority relied on provisions to the effect that parliament was to be chosen 
directly by the people to imply a freedom to communicate about political matters. Part 
of the freedom applied to elected representatives and their explanations of their 
decisions and actions, so voters could assess their performance. However, it was much 
broader, including the ability of voters, as well as other groups in society, to contribute 
to public debate about political matters. The freedom was not absolute in nature. In 
other words, some regulation of political communication might be acceptable, if it was 
proportionate to a legitimate end. A two-stage test was applied, considering (a) whether 
the law burdened political communication in terms or effect, and (b) whether, if it did, 
the burden was proportionate to the attainment of a legitimate objective (known as the 
“Lange limbs”).25 The court emphasised, however, that it would not necessarily take at 
face value claims by politicians that restrictions on political communication were 
justified, for instance to deal with corruption.26  
Members of the court drew a distinction between restrictions based on content, and 
restrictions on the mode of communication. Restrictions of the former type would be 
much harder to justify.27 In subsequent cases, this distinction has to some extent 
morphed into a discussion about laws with a direct impact on political communication, 
and laws with another purpose, with an incidental impact on political communication. 
Again, laws of the former type would be more difficult to justify.28 Case law since the 
initial case has also clarified other dimensions of the implied freedom of political 
communication.29 
Andrew Norton has reflected on the Australian Constitution’s liberal democratic 
basis, and its connection with the implied freedom, as follows: 
Creating checks and balances on the power (of the state) is the key goal of liberal-democratic 
constitutionalism […] political rights and freedoms, including giving and spending money for 
political reasons, are a necessary element of this system [...] (so) liberal democrats should see state 
controls on political donations and spending as deeply suspicious. These controls limit the 
capacity of people who are not in power to oppose the people in power […] donations caps limit 
the fundraising potential of opposition parties or candidates […] donation bans partially strip some 
                                                          
25 The limbs were developed in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 
567. 
26 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd, 145 (Chief Justice Mason), 239-240 (Justice McHugh). 
27 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd, 143 (Chief Justice Mason), 169 (Justices Deane and 
Toohey), 234-235 (Justice McHugh). 
28 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555 (Justices Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel 
and Bell); Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 16 (Chief Justice French, Justices 
Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell); Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [64](Chief 
Justice French). 
29 For instance, the freedom is negative in nature, being a defence to the application of a particular 
law, rather than a source of positive rights. The freedom applies at both state and federal level 
(Stephens v Western Australian Newspapers (1994) 182 CLR 211), and it applies to verbal and non-
verbal communication (Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579). Generally a broad view of the 
word “political” in the first limb has been taken: Coleman v Power (2004) 189 CLR 579; Monis v The 
Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259. 
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organisations and individuals of political rights to oppose the government […] general limits on 
‘third party’ political expenditure protect governments from big campaigns against them.30 
In December 2013, the High Court in Unions NSW v New South Wales upheld a 
constitutional challenge to part of the New South Wales donation laws. The Court 
found the blanket ban in s96D on political donations by any person not on the electoral 
roll, and any organisation or corporation, was constitutionally invalid as offending the 
implied freedom of political communication. These individuals and organisations could 
make an important contribution to political debate, and had a legitimate interest in 
government action and policy.31 Provisions aggregating, for the purposes of 
expenditure limits, donations by industrial organisations were also declared invalid. 
Both provisions burdened political communication, in terms of (a) of the Lange 
limbs.32 In terms of (b), neither the ban on individuals and organisations donating, or 
the aggregation of donations by industrial organisations for the purposes of applying 
spending limits, related to a legitimate objective.33 
This case did not involve a challenge to the general caps on donations, or general 
spending limits. Nevertheless, the High Court made some comments about these that 
are considered relevant for current purposes. In applying the first Lange limb, the Court 
acknowledged that these restrictions burdened political communication. In terms of the 
second, their comments were somewhat opaque. They clearly believed they were more 
justifiable than the provisions invalidated in the case, finding the donation caps and 
spending limits “obviously directed to the mischief of possible corruption”.34 This does 
not mean that such provisions were valid. The court was not asked to consider that 
question, and did not answer it. It could not say that the provisions invalidated were 
obviously directed to avoiding corruption. As a result, the recent High Court decision 
answers some questions, but not the question of the constitutionality of general 
donation caps, and expenditure limits.35 
Comparable Nations 
Our legal principles can only be enriched by considering the experience elsewhere. In 
relation to the implied freedom of political communication, the United States is an 
ideal source of wisdom. Though there are clearly some differences between the 
relevant American free speech provision and the Australian provision,36 there are many 
case examples in Australia where the judges have themselves referred to the American 
learning in this area.37 It seems sensible to see what we can learn from another great 
                                                          
30 Democracy and Money: The Dangers of Campaign Finance Reform (Centre for Independent 
Studies Policy Monograph 119, Sydney, 2011), p.2. 
31 [30]. 
32 [43]. 
33 [53-54]. 
34 [53]. 
35 Anne Twomey, “Freedom of Political Communication and its Constitutional Limits on Electoral 
Laws”, in Tham, Costar and Orr, eds., Electoral Democracy; Graeme Orr, The Law of Politics: 
Elections, Parties and Money in Australia (Sydney, 2010), pp.246-247. 
36 The American protection is broader in several respects – it is a positive source of rights, rather than 
a negative protection from legislation interfering with the freedom, and it is not confined to speech in 
the “political” context, unlike the Australian freedom. The High Court has stated that the Australian 
principle should be referred to as a freedom, whilst the United States equivalent is often expressed to 
be a right. 
37 Some examples include: Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 
106, 140 and 143 (Chief Justice Mason), 231, 235 and 239 (Justice McHugh); Nationwide News v 
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democracy. Space restrictions do not allow a full amplification of the case law, but the 
following represents a summary of the current United States position:38 
(a) the right to participate in government elections, including donating money to a candidate or 
candidates of choice, is a fundamental democratic right (McCutcheon); (b) the Supreme Court has 
drawn a fundamental distinction between limits on donations and limits on spending by 
independent bodies, candidates or parties, with the former more likely to be constitutionally 
acceptable; (c) concerns about actual or perceived corruption arising from contributions may 
justify restrictions (Buckley), although recently the Court specifically held that independent 
expenditures did not give rise to corruption concerns; (d) while at one time supportive of 
restrictions on corporations financing political campaigning (Austin, McConnell), the Court now 
states that free speech protections apply to corporations as well as individuals (Bellotti, Citizens 
United); (e) individuals and parties will seek ways around legislation here, so any restrictions must 
be carefully drawn — specifically, tailored to a clearly justified interest, and should not be 
overbroad in seeking to achieve any legitimate objective/s; arguments that restrictions are needed 
to prevent the distorting effect of donations, prevent corruption or protect shareholders (a 
corporate donor) are not necessarily taken at face value; (f) distinctions between express advocacy 
and issue advocacy — specifically, counting the former, but not the latter, in terms of policing 
spending limits, may not be helpful, unless the concepts are carefully defined (Wisconsin, 
McConnell); and (g) aggregation provisions, restricting how much a donor can contribute in total 
to all candidates, are likely to breach free speech rights (McCutcheon). 
Are the Current Australian Laws Valid? 
As indicated above, the Australian implied freedom of political communication 
requires the asking of two questions. Firstly, whether the challenged act burdens 
freedom of political communication; secondly, if it does, whether the burden it places 
is compatible with and proportionate to the attainment of a legitimate objective. If the 
answer to the first question is yes and the answer to the second question is no, the Act 
is constitutionally invalid. 
Clearly the New South Wales legislation burdens freedom of political 
communication. It does so in at least three ways. Firstly, it limits the amount that an 
individual or organisation can donate to a political party. It is clear that the act of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 32 (Chief Justice Mason), 79 (Justices Deane and Toohey); Theophanous v 
Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 130 (Chief Justice Mason, Justices Toohey and 
Gaudron); Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594 (Chief Justice Brennan), 623 (Justice McHugh), 
638-642 (Justice Kirby); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 75 (Justices Gummow and Hayne); 
Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 295 ALR 197, [151](Justice 
Heydon); Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [27-28](Chief Justice French); Wotton v 
Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 21 (Justice Heydon); Adrienne Stone, “Freedom of Political 
Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law”, Federal Law Review, Vol.26 (1998), p.220; 
cf the claim in Monis v The Queen (2013) 295 ALR 259, [326] that: “there is little to be gained (in 
considering the Australian implied freedom) by recourse to jurisprudence concerning the First 
Amendment” (Justices Crennan, Kiefel and Bell). 
38 Buckley v Valeo 424 US 1 (1976); First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti 435 US 765 (1978); 
Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce 494 US 652 (1990); McConnell v FEC 540 US 93 
(2003); FEC v Wisconsin Right to Life 551 US 449 (2007); Citizens United v FEC 558 US 310 
(2010); McCutcheon v FEC 572 US --- (2014). The United States cases are discussed in a range of 
literature; see for example Francis Bingham, “Show Me the Money: Public Access and 
Accountability After Citizens United”, Boston College Law Review, Vol.52 (2011), pp.1027-1064; 
Lili Levi, “Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform: Can the FCC Help Save American Politics After 
Citizens United?”, Catholic University Law Review, Vol.61 (2012), pp.97-174; Richard Briffault, 
“WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of Campaign Finance Law”, Ohio State 
Law Journal, Vol.68 (2007), pp.807-848; Stephanie Palmer, “The Courts: Legal Challenges to 
Political Finance and Election Laws”, in Keith Ewing, Jacob Rowbottom and Joo-Cheong Tham, eds., 
The Funding of Political Parties (New York, 2012). 
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donating itself is a type of “political communication”, suggesting support of that 
political party. Secondly, by limiting what a particular party/candidate can spend on an 
election. Clearly, the vast majority of this money would be spent communicating on 
political matters; in effect then, the restrictions burden freedom of communication. And 
thirdly, they burden the extent to which voters can hear the expression of views that 
would have occurred if the parties or candidates had been able to spend as much as 
they wished on communicating with the electorate. The answer to the first question is 
clearly “yes”. 
The second question is more difficult — the question of whether the restrictions are 
“justified”. It acknowledges that freedom of political communication is not absolute. It 
recognises that some restrictions on political communication may be justified, if 
narrowly tailored to the achievement of a legitimate objective. However, the 
government must demonstrate how the laws assist in attaining the legitimate objective, 
given the burden placed on freedom of political communication. The Courts must 
balance important competing interests here. At least two arguments can be made to 
justify restrictions, as will now be discussed.  
Prevention of Corruption or the Perception of Corruption 
The most common justification for limits on donations, or limits on electoral 
expenditure, is that they are needed to avoid corruption of government, or a perception 
of corruption, when those subject to government laws are donating to government. The 
Explanatory Notes to the (now repealed) 2011 Queensland Act, and the speech of a 
former New South Wales Premier at the time of introducing the (current) New South 
Wales provisions, made clear that preventing corruption is a goal of these regimes. 
On the other hand, a healthy dose of cynicism is in order. It appeared in the 
judgment of Chief Justice Mason in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. That great 
judge reminded us that courts must not accept at face value arguments by the 
legislature that limits on political communication were necessary to avoid corruption. 
That argument was very easy to mount. Chief Justice Mason rightly pointed out that 
any such assertion needed to be supported by evidence. 
Is there evidence of widespread political corruption through the use of political 
donations and unlimited expenditure on elections? Revelations at the 2014 ICAC 
inquiry notwithstanding, very often the evidence has been lacking. The United States 
Supreme Court noted in its Citizen United decision of another case, McConnell, that of 
the 100, 000 pages of records in the case, there was no evidence of votes being 
exchanged for expenditure, and only very minor evidence of ingratiation. Similarly, in 
Randall the Court was not convinced of the case for regulation based on corruption. 
Several leading political scientists have devoted research to this issue, with many 
doubting the evidence of a links between donations and political actions by donees. 
These comments summarise much of the literature: 
Despite the claims of the institutional critics and the growing public concern over (lobby groups) 
during the past decade, the scientific evidence that political money matters in legislative decision 
making is surprisingly weak. Considerable research on members’ voting decisions offers little 
support for the popular view that (lobby groups’) money permits interests to buy or rent votes on 
matters that affect them.39 
                                                          
39 Richard Hall and Frank Wayman, “Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias 
in Congressional Committees”, American Political Science Review, Vol.84, 3 (1990), p.798; Ian 
Ramsey, Geoff Stapledon and Joel Vernon, “Political Donations by Australian Companies”, Federal 
Law Review, Vol. 29 (2001), p.193; Iain McMenamin, “Business, Politics and Money in Australia: 
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There is cause to doubt the power of outside money to deliver consistently favo(u)rable political 
outcomes. A correlative relationship between money and political outcomes is not the same as a 
causative relationship; more money may often simply reflect greater underlying constituent 
support for a candidate. At a minimum, the ‘hedging strategy’ of corporations […] giving money 
to both parties […] suggests that corporations lack complete confidence that their donations will 
lead to favo(u)rable political outcomes.40 
There is sparse literature suggestive of the argument that donations are intended to, or 
do, influence the votes of donees, or donee political parties.41 While it is difficult to 
draw conclusions from particular examples, it is worth considering the example of an 
industry which has derived very large quantities of government financial assistance in 
recent years, the Australian car industry. Of the three major players in that industry, 
Norton notes that neither Holden nor Toyota has made a contribution in recent history, 
and the last time Ford gave money was in the 2004-2005 year.42 Australia continues to 
rank as a country least affected by corruption, with a 2012 Transparency International 
Index ranking Australia seventh out of 176 in terms of countries with the least 
corruption.43 Iain McMeniman comments that “illegal (corrupt) exchanges between 
politics and business are rare in Australia”.44 
Other factors to be considered in weighing the government claim that restrictions on 
donations or limits on expenditure are appropriate to a legitimate objective of reducing 
the risk of actual corruption, or the perception of corruption, is that existing measures 
require the disclosure of donations over a certain amount, gifts over a certain amount 
must be declared (as ex-Premier O’Farrell can attest), and that existing anti-corruption 
authorities exist to tackle corruption, or activities that may be seen as potentially 
corrupt. Anti-corruption bodies such as ICAC and the CCC clearly have strong powers 
to investigate possible corruption within the state. 
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In short, a court might find that the restrictions in the New South Wales laws are not 
reasonably appropriate to meeting the legitimate end of preventing corruption of our 
political system, given the lack of real evidence of the connection between donations 
and corruption. It is even more difficult to justify expenditure limits on the need to 
avoid corruption, since there is even less of a link between the amount a political party 
might spend in an election campaign and any particular donor who might wish for 
political favours. I will now consider an alternative justification, the “level playing 
field” argument. 
Level Playing Field 
Another argument made in support of both donation and expenditure limits is that they 
are necessary to achieve some kind of equality across the political spectrum.45 An 
example appears in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
To ensure a right of equal participation in democratic government, laws limiting spending are 
needed to preserve the equality of democratic rights and ensure that one person’s exercise of the 
freedom to spend does not hinder the communication opportunities of others […] such spending 
limits are necessary to prevent the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse and 
consequently depriving their opponents of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be heard.46 
On the other hand, some experts in the field have questioned the suggestion that true 
equality is a desirable or realistic goal of electoral finance laws, and that fairness, 
rather than equality, might better reflect the legitimate goal of regulation here.47 Even if 
this type of concept is a legitimate goal, questions arise regarding the efficacy of the 
tools chosen. Keith Ewing states that the impact of limits on political donations on 
electoral equality is “equivocal”48 and suggests that caps on donations can lead to 
inadequate funding of political parties.49 Further, it is not precisely clear what a “level 
playing field” would actually look like. 
Further, as Justice McHugh said in the Australian Capital Television case, it is not 
enough to merely assert that the playing field is so unbalanced, compromising the 
ability of electors to make an informed choice amongst a range of views, as to justify 
government regulation.50 Convincing evidence is required of the existence of the 
problem, and that the legislation is a legitimate and proportionate response to it. Does 
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the evidence suggest that there is domination of political communication by one voice 
at the expense of others? 
The most recent evidence suggests broad equality in current electoral expenditure. 
According to the annual reports of political parties, available publicly on the Australian 
Electoral Commission website, the Australian Labor Party had federal receipts in the 
last year for which figures are available (2012-2013) of $13.8 million, and expenditure 
of $6.47 million. Together, the Liberal and National parties had federal receipts of 
$14.1 million, and expenditure of $11.8 million. The Greens had total receipts of $2.7 
million, with expenditure at very similar levels. Many other parties filed annual returns 
with the Commission. As between the “main” political parties, those with the only 
realistic opportunity of forming government, there is in fact remarkable equality, not 
inequality, in their ability to raise money and their spending levels. Further, the recent 
rise of the Greens, and the more recent rise of other minor parties such as the Liberal 
Democrats, tends to negate any suggestion that political communication is dominated 
by the major political parties, or that alternative voices cannot be heard. 
It is also a possible consequence of the restrictions in New South Wales that, rather 
than create a level “playing field”, they will make it tougher for new players to enter 
that field. The corollary of the limits on political donations is an increase in public 
funding of parties, limited to those with at least 4 per cent of the vote (now 6 per cent 
in Queensland). This threshold potentially excludes new players. It does not 
compensate third parties for restrictions on their ability to donate or spend. Further, 
small parties that lack the membership numbers to become registered face even tighter 
restrictions on the donations they can receive and the electoral expenditure they can 
occur. Clearly, the ALP was strongly reliant on union donations to become established, 
as was the Liberal Party strongly reliant on business donations in its early years. These 
parties may not have existed if the right to donate had been tightly constrained.  
Another argument is that the fact individuals want to donate large amounts to 
individual candidates or parties reflects the strength of support they have to the 
candidate or party. The level of individual funding support for Barack Obama leading 
up to the 2008 United States presidential elections is an example of this. As Ewing 
acknowledges, preventing that party or candidate from spending those donations is 
arguably unfair, preventing the strong support that the candidate or party has from 
being shown during the campaign through the level of spend.51 
One must also acknowledge the growth of the Internet, Twitter and other forms of 
communication through which people access information.52 At one time, when 
newspapers and television dominated means of communication, there may have been 
an argument that it was only the richest players that could afford advertising in such 
media, creating an unlevel playing field in which the poor or minorities would struggle 
to enter. These days, when people have increasingly turned to electronic media for their 
news, the explosive growth of blogs, Twitter etc. reflect that lack of financial muscle is 
not the inhibitor it was in terms of communicating views. These trends must be borne 
in mind in seriously weighing claims that limits on spending and donations are 
necessary to create some kind of level playing field. 
It is noted that the European courts, in interpreting Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the right to receive and impart information and ideas 
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without interference by a public authority), have not validated restrictions based on 
arguments about a level playing field. Specifically, a limit on third party expenditure53 
and a ban on political advertising,54 were held to be incompatible with the Convention 
right. 
These measures are also typically easy to circumvent. Again, the United States 
experience is salient — the regulators were largely frustrated in their attempts to 
regulate political expenditure through the use of loopholes.55 It is very difficult to draft 
legislation that will withstand determined efforts to circumvent its intent.56 A cursory 
look at the (repealed) Queensland legislation shows broad loopholes; for instance, the 
donation cap applied to “political donations”. This was defined to mean a donation 
intended to be used for campaign purposes. A donor could circumvent this limit by 
making it clear there was no intention for it to be used in campaigning; the fact it 
actually was is irrelevant in terms of the definition. Further, s199 defined “electoral 
expenditure” importantly for the expenditure cap. It included material that advocated a 
vote for or against a candidate or political party. A clever advertiser could construct ads 
that did not “advocate”, but got the message across. Examples from the recent past 
might include advertising for or against the mining tax, carbon tax, or WorkChoices. 
This might not technically be “advocacy” within the expenditure limits.  
Many more examples could be given; the point is to highlight the difficulty, if not 
futility, in seeking to control political donations and spending, in order to reach some 
ill-defined end point of a level playing field. And perhaps worse, the laws will have 
greatest impact on those players who do not have access to competent lawyers to 
advise them how to lawfully circumvent the restrictions, while leaving the established 
parties with access to such advice untouched.57 
In short, a court might find that the restrictions in the New South Wales laws are not 
appropriate to achieving an end of “levelling the playing field”, even if that is accepted 
to be a legitimate end. Firstly, there is limited evidence that the playing field is 
currently “unlevel”; secondly, it is not clear that the restrictions enacted will do much 
to “level it up”, given the sizeable loopholes apparent in the new laws, and the great 
difficulty in drafting watertight political donation and expenditure laws. 
Conclusion 
Our system of governance struggles to reconcile its liberal democratic nature with calls 
for government regulation of political finance laws in order to reduce levels of actual 
or perceived corruption, or to create a level, or more level, “playing field”. This article 
has considered New South Wales laws capping donations and limiting electoral 
                                                          
53 Bowman v United Kingdom [1998] ECHR 4, [37]. 
54 Tv-Vest and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway [2008] ECHR 1687, [70-71]. 
55 Citizens United v Federal Electoral Commission 558 US 310 (2010); Richard Hasen, “The 
Transformation of the Campaign Financing Regime for US Presidential Elections”, in Ewing, 
Rowbottom and Tham, eds., The Funding of Political Parties, p.231: “it is commonplace to observe 
[…] that campaign finance regulations intended to stem the flow of money into electoral activity 
often lead to the money emerging through different forms or groups”; see in the Canadian context 
Colin Feasby, “Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime”, Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal, Vol. 45 (2007) pp.532-536. 
56 Graeme Orr, “The Currency of Democracy: Campaign Finance Law in Australia”, University of 
New South Wales Law Journal, Vol. 26, 1 (2003), pp.22: “the larger concern with caps on donations 
[…] involves their workability. It is generally assumed that US-inspired contrivances would be 
adapted to avoid any caps”; Orr, The Law of Politics, p.259. 
57 Orr, The Law of Politics, p.262. 
Donation and Spending Limits in Political Finance Law 605 
expenditure. It concludes that in light of the constitutional freedom of political 
communication, these restrictions burden that freedom in a way that is open to 
constitutional challenge given that they are arguably not appropriate to achieving a 
legitimate end, and that other effective mechanisms currently serve to deal with 
corruption, including the media, anti-corruption watchdogs, and disclosure laws. They 
will do little to reduce corruption, actual or perceived, and are not likely to contribute 
to any significant levelling of the “field”, an objective which itself is open to serious 
question. 
 
